NASAand the Board agreed that tests would be required and a test plan developed to validate an impact/breach scenario. Initially, the Board intended to act only in an oversight role in the development and implementation of a test plan. However, ongoing and continually unresolved debate on the size and velocity of the foam projectile, largely due to the Marshall Space Flight Centers insistence that, despite overwhelm- ing evidence to the contrary, the foam could have been no larger than 855 cubic inches, convinced the Board to take a more active role. Additionally, in its assessment of potential foam damage NASA continued to rely heavily on the Crater model, which was used during the mission to determine that the foam-shedding event was non-threatening. Crater is a semi-empirical model constructed from Apollo-era data. An- other factor that contributed to the Boards decision to play an active role in the test program was the Orbiter Vehicle Engi- neering Working Groups requirement that the test program be used to validate the Crater model. NASA failed to focus on physics-based pre-test predictions, the schedule priorities for RCC tests that were determined by transport analysis, the addition of appropriate test instrumentation, and the consid- eration of additional factors such as launch loads. Ultimately, in discussions with the Orbiter Vehicle Engineering Working Group and the NASAAccident InvestigationTeam, the Board provided test plan requirements that outlined the template for all testing.The Board directed that a detailed written test plan, with Board-signature approval, be provided before each test.